The Army’s $2.7 billion computing system designed to share real-time intelligence with troops fighting in Afghanistan and Iraq has hurt, rather than helped, efforts to fight insurgents because it doesn’t work properly, several analysts who have used the system say.
The analysts, who spoke on condition their names not be used, said problems with the DCGS-A system led Maj. Gen. Michael Flynn, the top military intelligence officer in Afghanistan, to write a July 2, 2010, memo citing the urgent need for a new system to analyze the vast amounts of intelligence being collected.
I think Gen. Flynn is undoubtedly right about the need for more intuitive analysts tools. What he wants, however, does not yet exist. DARPA is working on a universal mathematical language to link disparate data sets like text, video, MASINT, internet and radio waves as well as just about every emanators that could conceivably collect data from an area of operations.
It's also true that intelligence analysis does not occur in a vacuum. Because of security regulations, information dissemination is problematic at best. Moving large files between computers at the same location requires burning info on CD's, since bandwidth is often inadequate at lower levels. After Bradley Manning, life for the analyst got even harder with new security protocols designed to prevent a repeat of such an incident. Note however, that a determined leaker won't bother with existing protocols anyway.
It's extraordinarily hard to move information from different classification domains, and in many cases you cannot without risk of compromising sources and methods in a higher domain. Other dynamics include unit command climate (read commander idiosyncrasies); analyst time to task vice competing soldiers duties; barely a year's continuity in theater as well that our junior military analysts are mostly in their 20's and relatively inexperienced. It's not just the tools, but the quality of the analysts that use them.
I contend that all of these cause as much, if not more, friction to intelligence operations than a shortage of tools.
The Army will certainly think the answer is to shove more dollars at a contracted system, but that has proven inefficient in the past. DCCGs just came on a few years ago, and Gen. Flynn is already praising its inadequacies despite its 2.7 billion dollar price tag. And I don't disagree with him, since no one could predict the evolution of our intelligence structure and requirements in Afghanistan. The U.S. army however, still fails to appreciate the imperatives of complexity, non-linearity and emergence in its operations.
I'd recommend off-the-shelf tools cobbled together at unit levels and addressing a specific operational context, vice spending hundreds of millions of dollars on a one size fits all system that will be obsolete once the first government check is signed to the contractor. Examples of decentralized adaptation to threats are legion, and usually the best counter measures to tactical and operational threats.
If we find our intelligence apparatus lacking after spending over $1 trillion to subdue Afghan peasants, maybe it's our approach that needs updating.